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Rural credit markets in developing countries continue to frustrate policy makers.  High 
yield and price risk, significant costs accruing from large distances and poor infrastructure, 
and long time lags between planting and harvest have, to a large degree, prevented in rural 
areas the type of financial market deepening (especially among low asset entrepreneurs) that 
has taken place in urban and semi-urban areas thanks to the micro-finance “revolution.”  In 
spite of the general perception that rural financial markets perform poorly, relatively little 
empirical evidence exists about the prevalence and impacts of credit constraints on farm 
resource allocation (important exceptions include:  Carter and Olinto (2003), Foltz (2002), 
Petrick (2004)). 
This paper makes two main contributions.  First, it addresses the empirical void by 
estimating the impact of credit constraints on farm profits in Peru.  We follow the general 
approach of Fare, Grosskopf, and Lee (1990) and Blancard et. al. (2006) and estimate a 
farmer-specific financial (in)efficiency coefficient using non-parametric, data envelope 
analysis.  We then examine the determinants of financial inefficiency with a Tobit regression 
framework.  The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of 367 Peruvian farms 
surveyed in 2003 and again in 2004.   
Second, it extends the methodological approach of Fare, Grosskopf, and Lee (FGL) and 
Blancard et. al. (BBBK), who use non-parametric, data envelope analysis (DEA) to estimate 
the size of foregone profits due to credit constraints.  Our extension has two components.  
First, we acknowledge that non-price rationing in the credit market may manifest themselves 
not only as quantity constraints (quantity rationing) but also as risk and transaction cost 
constraints.  Each of these forms of non-price rationing, rooted in asymmetric information, 
can adversely affect farm profits.  The existing literature, in contrast, admits only quantity 
constraints (rationing).  The second contribution is more empirical.  Due to data constraints, 
the existing literature assumes that “the total expenditures over the accounting period indicate 
the maximum amount the farmer can spend on organizing production” (Blancard et. al. page 
354).  Under this method, any farmer who could have reached a higher profit by spending 
more is classified as financially constrained.  The result is an overestimation of the 
importance of financial constraint as this method “reveals the subset of potentially credit-
constrained farms” (Blancard et. al. page 355). Our survey instrument enables us to reduce 
this source of bias as it directly elicits the farmer’s constraint status with respect to the credit 
market.  If the frontier generated by DEA suggests that a given farmer could have increased 
  1his profit by spending more on variable inputs, the forgone profit is attributed to financial 
inefficiency only if this farmer indeed expressed excess credit demand.
1  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses the multiple forms of non-
price rationing that may obtain in credit markets and describes the “direct-elicitation” survey 
methodology that provides information to directly classify each farm household as 
constrained or unconstrained with respect to the formal credit market.  Section 3 lays out the 
linear programming framework underlying the DEA analysis.  It also provides a graphical 
analysis that illustrates the various efficiency measures.  Section 4 introduces the data and the 
specification of the non-parametric empirical model.  Section 5 presents empirical results of 
the frequency and depth of financial inefficiency.  Section 6 presents the specification and 
results of the tobit model that examines the determinants of financial inefficiency.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Non-price rationing in credit markets:  Definitions and measurement 
In this section we carefully define the term credit constraint, arguing for an expanded 
definition that goes beyond conventional quantity rationing to include demand-induced 
withdrawal from credit markets as a result of transaction costs and risk.  We then briefly 
describe a survey methodology to directly measure each household’s rationing “mechanism” 
in the formal credit sector. 
 
2.1 Multiple manifestations of credit constraints 
High degrees of risk combined with poorly defined property rights and lack of 
information infrastructure imply that rural credit markets in developing countries are likely to 
suffer from serious imperfections, with the result that many farmers find themselves facing a 
binding credit constraint.   The root of endogenous credit rationing is asymmetric 
information.
2  Beginning with the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a long 
theoretical literature demonstrates that the moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
endemic to credit transactions may lead to quantity rationing, whereby lenders refuse to raise 
the interest rate to eliminate excess demand.  In an agricultural context, a quantity rationed 
farmer is unable to gain access to her desired amount of credit and, as a result, is unable to 
apply the profit maximizing level of inputs. 
                                                 
1 Excess demand corresponds to an unmet credit demand with respect to a first best world of perfect information. 
2 Exogenous credit rationing occurs, for example, when government imposes a binding interest ceiling (Gonzales 
Vega ,1990). 
  2Quantity constraints are thus a supply-side manifestation of asymmetric information.  
Quantity rationed farmers are involuntarily excluded from the credit market by lenders.  
Several recent papers have pointed out that the same underlying information problems can 
also reduce participation in credit markets by restricting farmers’ demand (Boucher, Carter 
and Guirkinger 2006; Guirkinger and Boucher 2006).  The key insight is that lenders’ 
responses to asymmetric information go beyond the decision of whether or not and how much 
to lend.  As described by Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), lenders have two additional means of 
responding to information asymmetries.  On one hand, they may directly attack information 
asymmetries by screening applicants and monitoring borrowers.  While these actions may 
help lenders avoid granting loans to undesirable “types” and provide borrowers with the 
incentives to avoid undesirable “actions”, they also may imply significant monetary and time 
costs for the borrower.  A farmer is transaction cost rationed if the non-interest monetary and 
time costs are sufficiently large that they lead a farmer to refrain from borrowing.    
On the other hand, lenders may indirectly address incentive problems by requiring that 
borrowers post collateral.  Perhaps the most obvious impact of collateral requirements is that 
they can lead to quantity rationing; farmers lacking assets of sufficient quantity or quality 
(i.e., titled) are excluded from collateral-based contracts.  As demonstrated by Boucher, Carter 
and Guirkinger (2006), collateral requirements may lead to another form of non-price 
rationing that they call “risk rationing”.  A farmer is risk rationed if she has access to an 
expected-income-enhancing credit contract but does not take it because the collateral 
requirement implies that she bear too much risk.  Risk rationing in developing country 
agriculture may be particularly problematic because of the almost complete absence of formal 
risk management tools such as crop and health insurance.   
 
2.2 Measuring credit rationing:  The direct elicitation approach 
The previous discussion argued that each form of non-price rationing (quantity, 
transaction costs, and risk) has similar implications for farm resource allocation; namely that 
efficiency is reduced and profits are foregone.  Any empirical evaluation of the performance 
of the credit market should thus account for all forms of credit constraints, whether they 
derive from the supply side (quantity rationing) or demand side (transaction cost and risk 
rationing).  The next section will discuss how previous analyses applying DEA analysis to 
evaluate the impact of credit constraints on farm efficiency can be augmented to incorporate 
transaction cost and risk rationing.  First, however, we briefly describe the survey 
  3methodology we employ to classify households’ rationing status.
3    This method allows us to 
directly observe whether or not a farmer is constrained and, if so, which non-price rationing 
mechanism is at play. 
The primary objective of the direct elicitation approach is to classify households as 
constrained or unconstrained with respect to a particular sector (for example formal) of the 
credit  market and, if constrained, to further identify whether the constraint derives from 
quantity, transactions cost or risk rationing.  The approach utilizes a combination of observed 
outcomes and qualitative questions.  First, households are separated into those that applied 
versus those that did not apply for a loan.  The rationing category of applicant households is 
determined based on the outcome:  rejected applicants are quantity rationed (constrained), 
while those whose application was approved are price-rationed (unconstrained). 
Classification of non-applicant farmers requires additional information.  They are first 
asked whether or not any lender would offer them a loan if they were to apply.  If yes, they 
were then asked why they did not apply.  Those that said they had sufficient own-liquidity or 
that the interest rate was too high (relative to their farm opportunities) were classified as 
price-rationed (unconstrained).  Non-applicant households who stated that the time, 
paperwork and fees of applying were too costly were classified as transaction cost rationed 
(constrained); while those that cited fear of losing land pledged as collateral are classified as 
risk rationed (constrained).  Finally, households that stated that no lender would offer them a 
loan were asked whether or not they would apply for a loan if they were certain that a bank 
would approve their application.  Those that said yes were classified as quantity rationed 
(constrained).  Those that said no were then asked why not, and their answers were used to 
classify them as above. 
 
3. The impacts of credit constraints on farm efficiency:  DEA framework 
3.1 Depiction of technology 
We follow FGL and generate individual measures of performance based on a series of linear 
programming problems, with and without an expenditure constraint. This enables us to 
estimate the loss in profit resulting from the presence of credit constraints. We extend their 
approach by using additional information about the constraint status of farmers with respect to 
the formal loan sector.  Specifically, we allow the expenditure constraint to bind only for 
those households who expressed excess demand in the credit market. This yields more 
                                                 
3 See Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli (2006) for a detailed discussion of the direct elicitation methodology. 
  4conservative estimates regarding the presence of credit constraint. We illustrate the difference 
between their and our approach by presenting both set of measures. 
An attractive feature of DEA analysis is that no functional form is imposed on 
technology.  Technology transforms inputs into outputs via a convex production set. 
Observations are used to define a non-parametric frontier of the production set.  Suppose we 
have K farms who produce outputs   using inputs  , such a non-parametric 
frontier is defined by the boundary of:   
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The vector z is used to form convex combinations of the observed input and output mixes. As 
discussed in FGL, this technology accommodates constant, increasing and decreasing return 
to scale. 
 
3.2 The farmer’s optimization problem 
The farmer’s optimization problem in the absence of an expenditure constraint is specified as 
in FGL.  Partition inputs between variable inputs   and fixed inputs  .  We 
assume that all farms face the same price vector for outputs  and variable inputs 
. Farmers choose variable inputs and outputs to maximize farm profit subject to the 
technology available.  The short-term profit for farm k is then the solution to the following 
linear programming problem:  
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  5Households who are credit constraint face a binding expenditure constraint; their expenditures 
on variable inputs cannot exceed their observed expenditure.  This is represented by the 
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binding credit constraint.  Financial efficiency thus represents the reduction in profit 
attributable to the existence of a binding credit constraint.  In contrast, actual efficiency is the 
profit loss due to a deviation between observed profit,  , and the maximum attainable 
profit, given the frontier T and the potential existence of an expenditure constraint: 
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= .  As described by FGL, overall efficiency is thus the product of financial 
and actual efficiency:  . 
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3.3 Illustration of financial and actual efficiency  
Figure 1 illustrates FGL approach to financial efficiency for a simple, single-input 
technology and illustrates how we can improve on their measure by incorporating the 
additional information made available regarding farm households’ credit constraint status. 
Given input and output prices we can represent profit by a line π.   The technological frontier 
is represented by the piecewise concave curve.  Unconstrained profit is maximized at A, so 
that a farm observed at A is both financially and actually efficient. Consider now a farm at 
point B. This farm is actually inefficient, as it could increase profit without increasing input 
expenditures by moving vertically to A. Similarly, a farm at E is actually inefficient and could 
increase profit by reducing input expenditures. To see how financial constraints appear, 
consider a farm at point C. Such a firm is actually efficient, as it cannot increase profit 
without increasing expenditures (or moving to the right). Without additional information on 
this farm’s liquidity (own and access to external credit) FGL must classify this farm as 
financially inefficient because in order to increase profit (move from C to A), the household 
would have to increase its expenditures. However, as noted by BBBK, this leads to an 
overestimation of financial efficiency. Consider, for example, the household at E.  The same 
factors that explain why a farmer is at E instead of A, for example lack of experience and 
  6managerial know-how, may also explain why a farmer is at C instead of A.  If so, then without 
any additional information, the profit foregone by the farmer at C would the mistakenly be 
attributed to a binding credit constraint. 
To avoid this problem we only attribute the profit difference between C and A to a binding 
credit constraint if the farmer expressed excess credit demand when directly asked about his 
participation in and terms of access to the credit market. Note that we cannot out rule that a 
farmer at C who expressed excess demand also lacks knowledge and would not be able to 









Figure 1. Technological frontier and profit function 
 
As discussed in the previous section, quantity rationing is only one form of credit 
constraints that would prevent a farmer at C from moving to A.  Even farmers who have 
access to a loan and who know that, by taking a loan they could (in expected value terms) 
reach point A may be reluctant to borrow because of the risk and/or transaction costs 
implied by the credit contracts available to them in the market.  These two factors can lead 
farmers to solicit less than the profit maximizing amount of credit or even withdraw 
completely from the credit market.  Risk and transaction cost rationing, just like quantity 
rationing, constraint farmer’s expenditure and result in profit losses.  
 
4. Context, data and model specification 
  74.1 Sample  
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of farm households that were 
surveyed in 2003 and 2004, in Piura, one of the main agricultural regions on the North 
Coast of Peru. The sample was drawn in 1997 to be representative of farming household 
in Piura.  From the original sample of 547 farmers, 490 were re-surveyed in both 2003 and 
2004.  Our present analysis focuses on households who generated more than $150 of 
annual gross farm output and who did not raise more than 5 cows.
4  Finally, we also 
excluded 5 farms that reported very contradictory information in 2003 and 2004.  We are 
thus left with a sample of 367 households whose production technology is fairly 
homogenous.
5
Sample farms are small with a mean area of 3.8 ha. Agriculture in this area is 
exclusively irrigated.  Rice, cotton and corn are the main annual crops, with 58% of 
farmers growing some rice, 34% growing corn and 18% growing cotton. Bananas, lemons 
and mangos are the main perennials, with 24% of the farmers growing bananas and 24% 
having fruit tree production. Piura is particularly relevant for an analysis of credit 
constraints for several reasons. First, financial constraints are likely to be prevalent as 
expenditures on variable inputs are important relative to farmers wealth, and farmers rely 
heavily on credit to finance production.  Second, improving small farmers’ access to 
market oriented formal institutions has been high on the political agenda for many years. 
An illustration is the recent land titling program that is intended to increase the collateral 
value of land and thereby the supply of formal credit for small farmers.  
  
4.2 Description of rural credit markets in Piura  
The rural credit market in Peru has undergone significant changes in the last fifteen years. 
Until 1992, the Agrarian Development Bank (Banco Agrario) held a monopoly over formal 
agricultural credit. The government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) implemented a financial 
liberalization program that shut down the Agrarian Development Bank in 1992, and 
eliminated interest rate controls in an effort to induce commercial banks to increase their 
presence in rural areas. The government also promoted the establishment of rural banks (cajas 
                                                 
4 The threshold of $150 constitutes a break-point in the distribution of gross output. Households with a gross 
farm output of less than $150 have production resembles gardening. 77 households were excluded by this rule. 
Half of them had no production at all and half had very limited production. 46 farmers were excluded because 
they were heavily engaged in raising cattle.  Significantly less detailed data are available on the cost structure of 
livestock operations.  Since livestock production technology is substantially different to cropping technology, we 
chose to exclude these farmers. 
5 For example, several farms had changes in the value of output of over $10,000 without any change in area 
cropped.  Scrutiny of the survey forms leads us to conclude that these are data collection errors. 
  8rurales), and the strengthening of municipal banks (cajas municipales). These local banks are 
the primary formal financial intermediaries for small farmers in the post-liberalization 
environment.  Alongside this set of formal institutions, a vibrant informal credit sector 
coexists.  Informal loans are primarily offered by local business owners, such as grain traders, 
rice mills and input supply stores. Finally, there is a small set of microfinance institutions run 
by NGO’s and local government that provide subsidized loans to small farmers.  
  The survey allows us to use the direct elicitation approach described in Section 2 to 
directly classify each household as constrained or unconstrained in the formal credit market 
and, if constrained, to further identify whether the constraint derive from quantity, transaction 
cost or risk rationing. As a result, our empirical measure of financial inefficiency evaluates 
the profit loss due to the existence of constraints with respect to the formal credit sector.  If 
the informal sector is a good substitute for an imperfect formal sector, then the profit loss due 
to formal credit constraint is likely to be small. We have reason to believe that the informal 
market offer less favourable terms than the formal market, as interest rates are much higher, 
loan size are smaller and maturity shorter.
6
  Table 1 gives the frequency of the various rationing mechanisms in the pooled sample 
of household in 2003 and 2004. 29% of farmers had a formal loan during the last 12 months 
and thus are price rationed with loan. Along with the 21% who had no profitable project to 
finance with a formal loan (the price rationed without loan), they constitute the group of 
unconstrained households. The most prevalent form of non-price rationing appears to be risk 
with 23% of the sample risk rationed, while 15% and 12% are transaction cost and quantity 
rationed respectively. The survey thus suggests that exactly 50% of households are non-price 
rationed, or constrained with respect to the formal sector.  
                                                 
6 Given the existence of alternative sources of loans, we may wonder whether it is appropriate to translate the 
existence of a constraint in the formal sector into an expenditure constraint such as equation (1), that strictly 
restrict the amount of expenditure. In fact, the problem may be reformulated with a constraint on the cost of fund 
rather than equation (1). It is easy to show that having a binding expenditure constraint for credit constrained 
farmers is equivalent to impose them a tax on expenditure (with the value of the tax equal to their shadow value 
of liquidity in the first formulation). Thus, as long as alternative sources of funds are more expensive than formal 
sector loans, a formal sector credit constraint may be represented by equation (1). 
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Table 1: Frequency of formal sector rationing outcomes 
Rationing mechanism  Frequency 
(pooled sample) 
Price rationed with loan  29% 
Price rationed without loan  21% 
Transaction cost rationed  15% 
Risk rationed  23% 
Quantity rationed  12% 
 
4.3 Linear programming model specification 
We assume that all farmers in the sample face the same prices, which is not implausible given 
the good communication infrastructure of the region and the similar structure and size of 
farms.  FGL show that, with this assumption, revenue and costs can be directly used to derive 
the efficiency measures instead of physical units and price.  Similar to BBBK, we separately 
estimate a frontier for each year and thus impose minimal assumptions on technological 
change and on potential changes in price and climatic conditions that would affect the whole 
sample.  
We define five fixed factors and four variable inputs.  Three fixed factors are related to 
owned land, as we separate total area owned into area with annual crops (that may be rented 
out), area with bananas, and area with fruit trees. The reason for this separation is that land 
cannot be easily and quickly converted from permanent crop production to annual crop 
production (or vice versa).  We thus assume that farmers take this land allocation as given 
when they maximize short run profit. The remaining two fixed factors are the household’s 
endowment of family labor and farm equipment. Family labor is measured in adult 
equivalents with weights defined by age and sex.
7  Farm equipment is measured as the flow 
value of agricultural machinery held by the household.  Variable inputs are hired labor, 
irrigation costs, expenditures on chemical inputs and machinery rentals.  All are expressed in 
Peruvian Soles.  Given our fixed inputs, the financial efficiency coefficient we construct is 
implicitly of a short run nature.  It ignores longer term impacts of credit constraints that 
would, for example, influence farmers’ permanent crop planting decisions or investment in 
                                                 
7 Children under 10 years old are given a weight of zero while those between 10 and 15 are given weight of 0.5.  
Men are given a weight of 1 and women a weight of 0.75. 
  10machinery. As a result we obtain a lower bound estimate of the overall impact of credit 
constraints. 
Table 2 present descriptive statistics for these inputs and for the three types of output 
we consider: revenue from annual crops, permanent crops and from land rental. Note that 
variable input cost and output are aggregated into a single measure of revenue and 
expenditure in the linear programming problem.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics inputs and outputs over 2003 and 2004 
Variable  mean SD 
Output (um)      
Value of annual crops (soles)  11,759  15,027 
Output of fruit and bananas (soles)  3,087  10,999 
Revenue from land rental (soles)  98  386 
Fixed Factors (xf)      
Area in annual crop production or rented out (ha.)  2.8  2.5 
Area in fruit trees (ha.)  0.60  2.15 
Area in bananas (ha.)  0.37  19.62 
Family labor endowment (days)  417  232 
Value of farm equipment (soles)  11,700  26,200 
Variable Inputs (xv)      
Expenditure on hired labor (soles)  1,599  2,181 
Expenditure on irrigation (soles)  433  448 
Expenditure on chemical inputs (soles)  2,693  3,397 
Expenditure on machinery rental  914  1,392 
All figures are in 2004 soles.  $1 = 3.47 Soles. 
 
5. The depth of financial inefficiency:  Results from the DEA analysis 
The efficiency analysis described in Section 3 was carried out using three different 
methods to classify constrained versus unconstrained farms.  The first method uses no 
auxiliary information on farmers’ credit rationing outcomes and thus mimics the approach of 
FGT and BBBK.  As described above, this method assumes that observed expenditures 
represent the maximum possible expenditure so that all farmers in the sample could 
potentially be classified as credit constrained.  The second and third methods draw on 
auxiliary information from the direct elicitation module of the survey to restrict the subset of 
potentially financially inefficient households.  In the second method, the expenditure 
  11constraint is only imposed on households that are identified as quantity rationed.  The third 
method imposes the expenditure constraint on households facing any form of non-price 
rationing (quantity, risk, transaction cost) in the formal credit market. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of efficiency decomposition by method 
  No auxiliary information  Constrained restricted to 
quantity rationed 








































































Table 3 summarizes the results.  When no auxiliary information is used, 429 (just 
under one-half) of sample households are classified as financially constrained, as maximising 
profit given their endowment would have required greater spending on variable inputs.  In 
contrast, when we restrict potentially financially constrained households to those that are self-
reported to be quantity rationed, we find that only 57 of the households are financially 
constrained.  When transaction cost and risk rationed households are also included in the pool 
of potentially financially constrained households, this number increases to 239. While half of 
the sample appeared credit constraint according to the direct elicitation approach, the DEA 
analysis reveals that one-third face a binding short run expenditure constraint. Some farmers 
that were classified as non-price rationed using the direct elicitation survey method thus 
appear financially efficient in the short run.  Two factors can explain this.  First, as mentioned 
above, we only capture short term impacts of credit constraints.  If, for example, a farmer 
wishes to invest in banana plantation but has to forgo his project because of credit constraint, 
he would not necessarily appear financially inefficient using our DEA approach as land 
allocation across bananas and annual crops is treated as a fixed factor.  Second, our measures 
of efficiency are relative to what other households in the sample are doing.  Thus if a farmer 
could increase his profit with a larger loan, but this unconstrained profit cannot be obtained 
from a convex combination of profits of farmers in the sample, the farmer would appear 
financially efficient (loosely: nobody with greater liquidity does better than him). To put it 
  12more dramatically, if all farmers in the sample do the same and are all credit constrained, they 
would appear financially efficient.  
While the method used clearly affects the fraction of households considered 
constrained, it has less of an impact on the mean level of financial efficiency for constrained 
households.  For constrained households, the profit loss due to credit constraints is 21% when 
no auxiliary information is used to restrict the set of constrained farmers, 25% when only 
quantity rationed are allowed to be financially constrained and 24% when all non-price 
rationed household may be financially constrained. The overall level of farm efficiency is also 
lower for financially constrained households. Relative to the constrained maximum profit, 
profit losses due to actual inefficiency are 79% when we use the full information set to 
classify households.  For financially efficient farmers, profit losses are 54% relative to 
maximum attainable profit.  
 
6. Accounting for financial inefficiency:  A Tobit analysis 
 
In this section we seek to explain the measured heterogeneity in financial inefficiency.  As 
we have a mass of observations at 1 (i.e., farms that are financially efficient), we use a tobit 
model where the dependent variable has an upper bound at 1.  As argued above, credit 
constraints can derive from both the supply and demand side of the credit market.  Thus to 
explain financial (in)efficiency need regressors that influence both demand and supply. 
Table 4 presents definitions and summary statistics for the variables included in the 
estimation.  Formal credit supply is likely to be positively influenced by the following factors: 
farm size, the proportion of a household’s land that has a registered property title, whether or 
not the household has alternative sources of liquidity such as a business, and the value of 
durable goods the household owns.  The first two variables influence the value of collateral 
the farmer may put up for a loan, while the last two increase the likelihood that the household 
is able to pay back his loan in case of a negative agricultural shock.  Land quality may also 
increase credit supply if it positively impacts the profitability of farm investment and if the 
lender observes land quality.  Conversely the use of pumps for irrigation indicates a lower 
availability of irrigation water (compared to farmers able to rely solely on gravity) and 
implies higher irrigation costs, so that banks may be more reluctant to lend to farmer who rely 
on pumps.  As discussed in Section 3, credit demand is likely to depend on the size of 
transaction costs and on a farmer’s risk environment and risk aversion. Financial efficiency is 
thus expected to decrease with distance to the closest local bank and to increase with the 
  13wealth of farmers (and thus the value of durables for example). Note that the effect of 
household wealth on financial efficiency may stem from greater credit supply and demand, 
but also from alternative sources of funds such as savings.  The household’s labor endowment 
and the existence of credit programs in the community are also expected to increase financial 
efficiency, as they are likely to mitigate the potential negative impacts of a binding credit 
constraint in the formal sector, through a substitution of labor or of other sources of liquidity 
for the lack of formal funds. Finally, a regional dummy controls for the location of the 
household within a zone particularly favoured by communication infrastructure and the 
proximity of dynamic local banks.  
Table 4: Definition and summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable 
Name  Variable Definition  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
areaowned  Total area owned (ha)  3.81  4.34 
business  1 if household has a business with more than $150 of assets  0.06  0.23 
edhhh  Number years of education of household head  4.66  3.91 
v_durab  Value of household durables (soles)  1,182  2,925 
proptit  Proportion of household land that is titled  0.65  0.46 
availL  Total family labor available on the farm (weights by sex and age)  2.25  1.19 
credprog  1 if the village has a micro-credit program   0.31  0.46 
distcaja  Distance to the closest local bank (in min)  25.0  24.5 
bombeo  1 if part of the irrigation is through pumping  0.11  0.32 
wmqual  Average self-reported land quality on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 = best)  3.42  0.67 
Ch  Regional dummy (Chira valley)  0.50  0.50 
 
We estimate the tobit model in two ways : (1) Tobit on the pooled sample and ; (2)  random 
effects Tobit to exploit the panel nature of the data set.  Table 5 reports the results of the tobit 
estimations.  Columns 1 (pooled Tobit) and 2 (random effects Tobit) present the parameter 
estimates when the dependent variable is the financial efficiency coefficient calculated using 
no auxiliary information.  Columns 3 and 4 do the same when the financial efficiency 
coefficient is calculated using the auxiliary information (potentially constrained households 
are those that are classified as non-price rationed).  The results are surprisingly similar both 
across estimation techniques and across the type of financial efficiency measure used.   As 
expected, owning a business, being more educated, having more durables, a greater portion of 
land titled, being in a community with a credit program and land quality are all positively 
correlated with financial efficiency. Pumping water for irrigation has the expected negative 
sign on financial efficiency but is not significant; whereas farm size and distance to the closest 
bank have a counter-intuitive sign but are not significant.  
 
  14Table 5: Results of tobit estimation on the determinants of financial efficiency 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Regressor  tobit re  tobit pooled  FGL tobit re  FGL tobit pooled 
-0.01 -0.01  -0.00  -0.01 
areaowned 
(1.36) (1.53)  (1.03)  (1.36) 
0.22836 0.23937  0.16412  0.16700 
 business 
(2.04)** (0.38) (2.40)**  (2.58)** 
0.01 9.97e-03  0.01  1.39e-02 
edhhh 
(1.96)* (1.90)*  (3.89)*** (3.50)*** 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
v_durab 
(2.30)** (2.29)**  (0.75)  (1.20) 
0.09 0.10  0.06  0.07 
proptit 
(2.18)** (2.06)**  (2.05)**  (2.76)*** 
-0.01 -0.01  -0.02  -0.01 
availL 
(0.44) (0.38)  (1.51)  (1.37) 
0.09 0.10  0.09  0.10 
credprog 
(1.92)* (1.91)*  (2.64)*** (3.05)*** 
0.00 0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
distcaja 
(0.75) (0.81)  (0.43)  (0.37) 
-0.04 -0.05  -0.00  -0.01 
bombeo 
(0.72) (0.92)  (0.06)  (0.23) 
0.09 0.09  0.04  0.03 
wmqual 
(3.00)*** (3.70)***  (1.69)*  (1.38) 
0.18 0.19  0.08  0.08 
Chira 
(3.40)*** (3.48)***  (2.24)**  (2.55)** 
-0.09 -0.09  -0.05  -0.05 
t 
(2.51)** (2.20)**  (2.45)**  (2.19)** 
0.70 0.69  0.75  0.75 
Constant 






Our empirical analysis of efficiency of small-farms in Northern Peru reveals a 
moderate degree of financial inefficiency deriving from constraints in the formal credit 
market.   We used non-parametric, Data Envelope Analysis to identify those farm households 
that are credit constrained.  We find that the method of classifying households as constrained 
or unconstrained has a significant impact on the reported frequency of credit rationing.  When 
  15no additional information is available regarding farmer’s credit access or their reasons for not 
participating in the credit market, we classify nearly 50% of households as credit constrained.  
In contrast, when we use auxiliary information gathered via the “direct elicitation” survey 
methodology and allow only those households identified as non-price rationed in the formal 
credit market to be potentially credit constrained, this number falls to 32%.  This suggests that 
previous estimates of the frequency of credit constraints are likely to significantly over-
estimate the incidence of credit rationing.  In contrast, the impact of credit constraints on the 
resource allocation of constrained households is less sensitive to the choice of technique; with 
each technique estimating a loss in profits of between 21 – 25%.
8  We also find that the 
parameter estimates of the determinants of financial efficiency (from the Tobit model) are 
relatively insensitive to the choice of technique. 
                                                 
8 Note, however, that the estimate of the overall impact of credit constraints on the sample is affected 
by the choice of technique because the overall impact is the product of the frequency of credit constraints and the 
impact of the constraint on the constrained households. 
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